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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 
Defendant \and Respondent, 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Intervenor and Respondent. 
Case No. 
7639 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Section 80-5-1 of the Utah Code as amended provides 
that: 
"•* • • all taxable property must be assessed 
at 40% of its reasonable, fair cash value. Land 
and the improvements thereon must be separately 
assessed." 
'Section 80-3-1(5) provides: 
" 'Value' and 'full cash value' mean the 
amount at which the property would be taken 
in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor." 
1 
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This appeal involves the question of whether these 
words mean what they seem to appellant clearly to say; 
or if they are to be so construed that the taxing authori-
ties can arbitrarily assign any figure as the value of 
specific property for tax purposes within the range 
from market value to an "astronomical figure" based 
upon the particular owner's earnings and his need for 
and use of that specific property in connection with his 
business operations. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Two tracts of real property—both exclusive of any 
surface improvements and mineral content—are here 
involved: the Kennecott tailings pond, and its millsite 
lands in Salt Lake County, Utah. The following facts 
are quoted from the stipulated findings (R. 2-10): 
"4(a) . Plaintiff's mining operation in the 
State of Utah is a vast and continuous operation 
beginning with what is commonly known as the 
Utah Copper Mine, one of the largest open-pit 
mines in the world. The ore is low grade, and 
large scale operations are essential to the profit-
able mining thereof. The pit is terraced with 
benches or levels varying in elevation from 50 
to 85 feet and in width from 65 to 300 feet, with 
a perimeter of approximately 5 miles and a 
maximum depth of approximately 1800 feet. 
" (b) The pit is reached by standard gauge 
railroad on the surface and by tunnel; the area of 
operations in Bingham Canyon is nearly 3000 
acres, which includes the open pit and about 150 
miles of standard gauge railroad tracks therein 
2 
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and in surface and subterranean connections be-
tween the pit and the reduction works owned by 
plaintiff at Magna and Arthur, Utah, about 13 
miles distant. Plaintiff is the owner of more than 
25,000 acres of land in Bingham Canyon and at 
and in the vicinity of the reduction works at 
Arthur and Magna. 
"5(a) The crude ores as mined by plaintiff 
and hauled from the mine at Bingham to mills at 
Magna and Arthur for concentration, contain a 
great quantity of waste material. In the course of 
the concentration process, less than three per cent 
by weight of the crude ores mined is removed in 
the form of concentrates. The concentrates con-
tain the values and are saved, smelted and refined 
and thus converted into a commercial product. 
One ton of concentrates is obtained from thirty-
six tons of crude ores, and the remaining thirty-
five tons, being the refuse material or tailings, are 
flowed out over and deposited in a tailings dump. 
" (b)In the course of the concentration of the 
crude ores from plaintiff's said mine and the ores 
mined therefrom by plaintiff's predecessors in 
interest, the discarded refuse material has been 
deposited year after year over the period of ap-
proximately forty-one years last past, in the 
vicinity of plaintiff's Magna and Arthur con-
centrating mills in said dump of tailings over an 
area of 6258.93 acres more particularly described 
in the complaint and in evidence before the court. 
"(c) The tailings for one year have been 
placed on the tailings of previous years, creating 
a dump at present of approximately 481,000,000 
tons of tailings spread over this area of 6258.93 
acres at an average depth of 36 feet. The tailings 
are of fine content, require constant treatment to 
prevent dust storms, and will not support or sus-
tain any growth. Before use as a tailings dump 
8 
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this area was swampy pasture land used for graz-
ing and pasturing and similar to land presently 
surrounding and adjacent to the dump area. The 
dump area has now lost all value for such uses, 
which have been destroyed. 
" (d) The crude ores have varied somewhat 
in their copper content, but over the past twenty-
five years the average copper contained therein 
has been approximately one per cent of their 
weight, In the course of the concentration or re-
duction process in the mills at Magna and Arthur 
over the past fifteen years the average percentage 
of recovery has been approximately ninety per 
cent. Thus the tailings contain approximately 
one-tenth of one per cent copper. These tailings 
are a permanent deposit upon this area, which has 
become and long has been a tailings dump and 
nothing else. Under any present methods the tail-
ings will never be worth removing and will never 
be removed. 
"(e) These tailings are worthless except in 
this, that over the past several years plaintiff has 
recovered from the water draining from the tail-
ings dump, copper in the form of copper precipi-
tates and thus the small quantity of copper re-
maining in the tailings after the reduction process 
has been completed is being slowly drained out 
of the tailings dump. In the year 1939—179,543 
pounds of copper was obtained from this source; 
in the year 1940—1,224,567 pounds; in the year 
1941—595,575 pounds; in the year 1942—412,241 
pounds; in the year 1943—478,390 pounds; in the 
year 1944—741,925 pounds; in the year 1945—348,-
254 pounds; and in the year 1946—148,101 pounds ; 
and the year 1947—401,073 pounds of popper were 
so produced. As is and has been well known, and 
understood by the taxing authorities of the State 
of Utah, the copper so recovered has been included 
4 
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in the total production figures annually reported 
to the State Tax Commission by this taxpayer, 
is reflected in net 'proceeds for the purpose of the 
mine assessment at two times their value, and as 
well in the gross proceeds of the mine upon which 
the mining occupation tax is and has been assessed 
each year. 
" ( f ) In order to retain the 481,000,000 tons 
of mine tailings in the 6258.93 acre dump, plaintiff 
and its predecessors have been required over the 
many years to expend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to construct the dike which is in place on 
the outside perimeter thereof. The total so ex-
pended far exceeds the tax values of said dump as 
assessed by defendant to which objection is made 
by plaintiff. This dike generally tapers from 
about an 85-foot base to a 20-foot top1, and is com-
posed of rock, gravel and solid earth in contrast 
to the fine tailings. In the initial stages of the 
deposit of the mine tailings on the old lake lands, 
no such dike was required. The necessity for the 
dike came into existence as additional tailings 
were piled upon tailings first deposited upon the 
swamp land. This process has continued until 
the average depth of the dike and tailings at the 
time of the assessment was about 36 feet. 
" ( g ) Plaintiff must continue to enlarge the 
dike from time to time at a cost of further thous-
ands of dollars per year in order to continue to 
contain the mine tailings, as additional tailings 
are continually added to the top of the dump. Ex-
cept for any unused portion, i.e., remaining capa-
city for additional tailings, the dike serves no 
purpose except to retain and prevent the tailings 
already deposited on the dump from flowing down 
and away from the dump, and thus trespassing 
upon other adjacent real property. 
" ( h ) The dump requires continuous, con-
0 
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stant attention, care and expense in order to avoid 
becoming a nuisance. The tailings must be kept 
moist. Litigation involving some three hundred 
plaintiffs and a damage claim of three million 
dollars has heretofore involved plaintiff with re-
spect to this dump. During 1950 apipiroximately 
$200,000.00 will be spent in connection with this 
dump in caring for current mine tailings and pre-
venting creation of a nuisance. 
" (i) Gradually the dump is approaching the 
maximum depth (or height) to which tailings can 
be retained by the existing dikes, which will in-
volve two problems: (1) assuming continuation 
of mining operations by plaintiff, the acquisition 
of additional dump sites by purchase or condem-
nation or construction of other dikes upon the ex-
isting tailings; and (2) the ultimate capping of 
the present dump with rock and material similar 
to the dike at a presently estimated cost of $5000.-
00 per acre in order to prevent surface blowing 
of the tailings by wind onto the property of others. 
"6. Plaintiff's mills at Arthur and Magna 
are situated upon tracts comprising a total of 982.-
42 acres of land owned by plaintiff and more par-
ticularly described in the complaint and in the 
evidence before the court. These lands are as-
sessed separately from any improvements or per-
sonal property thereon; they are not located upon 
patented mining claims or locations and are situ-
ated geographically against the base of a moun-
tain sloping down to the north where the refuse 
in the form of tailings dump is deposited on part 
of the bottom lands of old Lake Bonneville. These 
lands are situated so that they are particularly 
adaptable to a gravity process of reducing ores, 
are easily accessible to the American Smelting & 
Refining Gfurfield smelter where the concentrates 
produced at the Company's mills may be further 
6 
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reduced by smelting, and are easily accessible to 
to the railroads where the smelted products may 
be received and shipped to the refineries for the 
final reduction process to a marketable product. 
Lands similar to the millsite lands and adjacent 
thereto can be used for grazing and other pur-
poses since, as distinguished from the tailings 
dump area, the original characteristics of the mill-
site lands and their potential uses have not been 
destroyed. 
" 7 ( a ) . Prior to the year 1919 said lands 
were assessed by the county assessor of Salt Lake 
County. Commencing with that year and con-
tinuing to date said lands were assessed by the 
taxing authorities of the State of Utah, i.e., the 
State Board of Equalization for the years 1919 
to 1930, inclusive, and since that time by the State 
Tax Commission under the provisions of 80-5-56, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended. Said 
lands were assessed as real estate, and in addition 
there was assessed machinery and property of 
plaintiff and the surface use made of mining 
claims or mining property other than for mining 
purposes, and the assessed valuation based on net 
annual proceeds of the mine pursuant to Section 
80-5-56 et seq. 
'' (b) The assessment of plaintiff's mine was 
protested for the years 1917 and 1918 and resulted 
in litigation which terminated with the decision of 
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals No-
vember 12,1923, Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper 
Company, 294 Fed. 199. 
" ( c ) The assessment in particular with re-
spect to the tailings dump millsites and recreation 
area was protested in 1942 and each year there-
after, the protests for the years 1947 and 1948 
resulting in the present case, and that for the year 
1944 resulting in the case of Salt Lake County 
7 
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v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, decided by the 
United States Circuit Court of Appeals April 14, 
1947,163 Fed. (2d) 484. 
" (d) By stipulation in the course of trial the 
matter of the recreation area has been eliminated 
from this case, together with other issues ac-
cordingly not covered by these findings of fact. 
"(e) The lands in question, namely, the 
tailings dump and millsites, have never been re-
ported by plaintiff to the State Tax Commission 
as a 'mine or mining claim' or as patented mining 
ground. These lands have however, always been 
reported by plaintiff and its predecessors in in-
terest as a 'part of its mine' to be assessed at the 
statutory rate of $5.00 per acre, which requested 
assessment has always been denied by the Tax 
Commission. 
"(f) The only instance which has come to 
the attention of the Commission wherein a dump 
is located on other than a mining claim, patented 
or unpatented, is the Kennecott Copper Dump as 
outlined on Exhibit A. All other dumps being lo-
cated on a mining claim, patented or unpatented, 
have been assessed at $5.00 per acre. Plaintiff's 
Utah Copper Mine is by far the largest physically 
in Utah, but its mines and dumps differ in no 
respect except in relative size and the further fact 
that this dump is not located on a mining claim, 
patented or unpatented. This last factor is one of 
the criteria which the Commission claims is and 
should be considered in assessing these mining 
dumps either at $5.00 per acre under Section 80-
5-56, or at 40 per cent of its reasonable fair cash 
value. 
"8(a) . The values for which plaintiff's tail-
ings dump and millsites were assessed for 1947 
and prior years, the location of these lands with 
respect to adjacent lands, and the amounts for 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which said lands were assessed, are shown in 
Exhibit A herein and by reference made a part 
of these findings. Lands adjacent to and physi-
cally the same as the mill-site lands were assessed 
at $5.44 and $6.86 per acre. Lands adjacent to the 
tailings dump and physically the same as the 
dump land prior to its conversion to and use as 
such dump were assessed at figures ranging from 
$4.14 to $20.27 per acre with the exception of one 
632-acre tract of the Morton Salt Company asses-
sed at $66.16 per acre. This tract is used by owner 
for impounding thereon the salt brine removed 
from Great Salt Lake. The salt in the various 
stages of harvest in the owner's several salt 
ponds is separately assessed. The tract on which 
the salt plant is situated is assessed at $10.67 per 
acre. 
"(b) The rate of assessment per acre of the 
plaintiff's tailings dump and millsite lands ap-
plied for 1947 and 1948 has been the same since 
1919, except for two reductions in value along in 
1932 or 1933 at which time there were some gen-
eral reductions made in real estate values. Several 
changes in total acreage have occurred during this 
period which have been reflected in changes ac-
cordingly in the total assessment. Since the pro-
tests of the plaintiff in 1942 and thereafter the 
Commission has given consideration to the assess-
ment of the property herein involved and has 
determined that the said figure of $45.73 is 
reasonable, fair and proper. 
"9. The taxes which plaintiff paid under 
protest to defendant and for which recovery is 
herein sought are $12,163.97 for 1947 on the tail-
ings dump and $1909.27 on the millsites, less 
$1538.80 tendered by plaintiff for 1947 based 
upon a valuation of $5.00 per acre; and $13,169.00 
for 1948 less the same sum.'' 
9 
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II. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
INVOLVED 
a. Section 11, Article XIII of the Utah Constitu-
tion provides that the State Tax Commission shall assess 
mines for purposes of taxation. Section 80-5-3 of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1943 accordingly provides that the State 
Tax Commission must assess "all mines and mining 
claims, and the value of metalliferous mines" based on 
a multiple of the annual net proceeds as provided in 
subsequent sections, together with "all machinery used 
in mining and all property or surface improvements 
upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims and the 
value of any surface use made of nonmetalliferous min-
ing claims or mining property for other than mining 
purposes; all tangible property not required by the Con-
stitution or by law to be assessed by the state tax com-
mission must be assessed by the county assessor of the 
several counties in which the same is situated. For the 
purposes of taxation all mills, reduction works and 
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of reducing 
or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by the 
owner thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such 
mine or mining claim though the same is not upon such 
mine or mining claim." 
b. By Section 80-5-55 the 'State Tax Commission is 
required each year to prepare a mine assessment book 
in which is to be entered "the assessment of all mines 
in the state subject to assessment by it and in which book 
must be specified in separate columns and under appro-
priate heads: 
"(1) Owner of mine. 
10 
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"(2) Name and description and location of the 
mine. 
'' (3) County in whMi it is situated. 
"(4) Net proceeds in dollars, if a metalliferous 
mine. 
" (5) Number of tons of ore mined whether by the 
owner, lessee, contractor or otherwise. 
"(6) Amount received for ore and metal if sold; 
if not sold the value thereof. 
"(7) Value of mine. 
" (8) Value of the machinery, 
"(9) Value of supplies and other personal prop-
erty. 
' ' (10) Value of improvements. 
"(11) Value of machinery, property and surface 
improvements having a value 'separate and independent 
of all such mines or mining claims assessed by the state 
tax commission, and the names of the owners of the 
same.'y 
c. Section 80-5-32 provides that the county assessor 
shall furnish to the State Tax Commission a complete list 
and description "of all machinery used in mining, and 
all property and surface improvements upon or appurten-
ant to mines and mining claims, which have a value sepa-
rate and independent of all such mines or mining claims, 
owned by the owner of such mines or mining claims, situ-
ated in his jcounty, and note thereon the value of such 
property." 
11 
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d. Section 80-5-46(5) requires the Tax Commission 
to prepare and maintain from year to year a complete 
record of "a l l machinery used in mining and all property 
or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines 
or mining claims;" while Section 80-5-59 requires every 
person engaged in mining to make and file with the 
State Tax Commission a statement "showing the gross 
annual proceeds from each mine or mining claim and the 
production thereof in fine ounces of gold and silver and 
other precious metals, and in pounds of lead, copper and 
other semiprecious and base metals, and the deductions 
provided for Section 80-5-57, together with a statement 
showing all the machinery used in mining and all prop-
erty and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to 
each mine or mining claim owned or worked by such 
person during the year preceding, and the value of the 
same at 12 o'clock m. on the 1st day of January next pre-
ceding, * * * " 
/. Section 80-5-56 provides that "a l l metalliferous 
mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place, 
shall be assessed at $5 per acre and in addition thereto 
at a value equal to two time the net annual proceeds 
thereof for the calendar year next preceding;" while by 
the following section it is provided that : " T h e words, 
'net annual proceeds,' of a metalliferous mine or mining 
claim are defined to be the gross proceeds realized during 
the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion 
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such mine or 
mining claims extracted by the owner or lessee, contrac-
tor or other person working upon or operating the prop-
erty, including all dumps and tailings, during or previous 
12 
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to the year for which the assessment is made, * * *" 
less certain deductions only therein enumerated. 
g. Section 80-5-1 as amended in 1947 by Chapter 102 
of the Session Laws for that year provides that "all 
taxable property must be assessed at 40% of its reason-
able, fair cash value. Land and the improvements there-
on must be separately assessed;" while Section 80-3-1(5) 
provides " i Value' and 'full cash value' mean the amount 
at which the property would be taken in payment of a 
just debt due from a solvent debtor.'' 
h. Finally, 'Sections 2 and 24 of Article I of the 
Constitution of Utah and Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
guarantee equal protection and uniformity in the admini-
stration of laws; Section 7 of Article I of the Constitu-
tion of Utah and Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States prohibit 
the taking of plainiff's property without due process of 
law; and Section 2 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitu-
tion provides that all tangible property in the State of 
Utah shall be taxed in proportion to its value, while the 
following Section 3 of the same Article provides that the 
legislature "shall provide by law a uniform and eqtual 
rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible property 
in the State, according to its value in money, and shall 
prescribe by law such regulations as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such property, so that every 
person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to 
the value of his, her, or its tangible property * * *". 
IS 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. 
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the 
assessment was void because made in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner contrary to mandates for uni-
formity and equal protection. 
2. 
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the 
assessment was void because it violated the mandate that 
the valuation of these lands should be based upon the 
"amount at which the property would be taken in pay-
ment of a just debt due from a solvent debtor.'' 
3. 
The District Court erred in holding that the lands 
in question, particularly the tailings dump lands, were 
not a part of plaintiff's mine to which the statutory flat 
rate of $5.00 per acre should apply. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the 
assessment was void because made in an arbitrary and 
discriminatory manner contrary to mandates for uniformity 
and equal protection. 
The record is clear that Kenneeott alone of all the 
hundreds of mines in Utah has been singled out for 
"special attention." (R. 50) True, as the court suggested, 
the result may be that the tax treatment of the Kenneeott 
dump lands and millsite lands is correct and that the 
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Commission is only in error with respect to its treat-
ment of all other mine owners. Nevertheless, until the 
Commission indicates a willingness to correct all such 
other assessments, the result is arbitrary and discrimina-
tory and justifies action by the court to void such an 
assessment. 
As was said by the United States Supreme Court in 
the famous case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 30 
Led. 220: 
" Though the law itself be fair on its face and 
impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and 
administered by public authority with an evil eye 
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make 
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons 
in similar circumstances, material to their rights, 
the denial of equal justice is still within the pro-
hibition of the Constitution.'' 
Such a result would require action just as Utah's 
Supreme Court has said should be taken where the 
" property of one person, or a class of 'persons, or a par-
ticular class of property, is intentionally assessed at a 
a valuation greater in proportion to its real or cash value 
than is placed on the general mass of other taxable propt-
er ty * * •*. Denial of such right results in inequality and 
a want of uniformity in the assessment and taxation." 
First National Bank of Nephi v. Christensen, 39 Utah 568, 
118 P. 778, 
Here, as shown by Exhibit A, like property owned 
by others adjacent to the millsite lands is assessed at 
$6.86 and $5.44 per acre, and adjacent to the tailings 
pond at $4.14, $8.67, $8.73, $8.75, $6.75, $66.16, $10.67, 
$10.54, $4.85, $7.28, $7.33, $7.31 (four tracts), $10.06, 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$6.60, $5.19, $8.75, $10.91, $18.88, $7.50, $10.92, $11.31, 
$13.08, $13.06, and $2.2.89 (R, 12). 
But when the Tax Commission undertook to apply 
the same prescribed measure of valuation to the Ken-
necott lands, it brought forth the figure of $45.73 per 
acre. No one knows the origin of this particular figure, 
which is 40% of $114A0 per ucre, but when Kennecott 
protested Commissioner Hammond testified that the 
Commission considered the protest and was of the 
opinion this assessment was fair. (R. 95) 
These mine assessments were, it should be noted, 
made by the Commission as a rule on the basis of an 
"evaluat ion" by the witness Higgs. (R. 23) When 
plaintiff attempted to go beyond the "crystal ba l l " fiat 
of the Commission and to seek out the standards used 
by its evaluator in the case of Kennecott, Higgs said that 
he didn't know where the $45.73 figure came from except 
that it was not his own personal evaluation of the prop-
erty on the basis of its value. (R. 56) He testified that 
he had reported the Kennecott lands to the Commission 
as par t of plaintiff's mine and considered the tailings 
pond and the mills as a unit in the entire mining opera-
tion (R. 57); but that the Commission had instructed 
him to continue the use of the $45.73 figure (R. 55) ; 
although he knew of no other single instance among the 
hundreds of Utah mines which he had evaluated and 
with which he was familiar where such assessment was 
made at other than as par t of the mine at the flat $5.00 
p!er acre figure (R. 59). In Kennecott's case he used 
the figures given him by the Commission—he didn't 
evaluate. (R. 53) 
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Further, this magic figure of unknown origin was 
used by the Commission in disregard of the statutory 
mandates which until 1948 required use of full cash 
value, when by action of the 1947 legislature a reduction 
was made to 40% thereof. (R. 56) Finally, Mr. James 
W. Collins, whose reputation is well known, testified that 
the market value of the dump land was nominal (R. 74) 
and of the millsite lands $10.00 to $20.00 per acre. (R. 
77) 
By its actions it seems plain that the defendant 
Commission told Kennecott that regardless of constitu-
tion, statute or protests, it must accept this arbitrary 
and discriminatory assessment; and its counsel has 
frankly argued below the Commission's -contention that 
the courts are powerless to effect a remedy. 
2. 
The District Court erred in failing to hold that the 
assessment was void because it violated the mandate that 
the valuation of these lands should be based upon the 
"amount at which the property would be taken in payment 
of a just debt due from a solvent debtor." 
It seems clear to plaintiff that the Commission has 
departed from the statutory standards in determining 
what is value for tax purposes. Section 80-3-1(5), in 
qualifying Section 80-5-1, clearly indicates that, as admit-
ted by counsel for the Tax Commission, market value is 
the test. Again we repeat that the test is the "amount 
at which the property would be taken in payment of a 
just debt due from a solvent debtor." 
17 
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It is not the asset value or book value, but the 
market value which might be more or less. Continental 
National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 
63; 179 P. 67. There the taxing authorities attempted 
to go behind market value to determine the asset value 
of bank stock. It excludes such intangibles as good will. 
Section 80-3-1(1); Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 64 Utah 491, 210 P. 106. 
"Actual value has been defined as the value 
of property in the market in the ordinary course 
of trade. This standard of values prescribed by 
statute cannot be varied by public officers or by 
agreement of parties." 51 Am. Jur. 649. 
Plaintiff of course appreciates, as is further stated 
by all standard works, that: 
"All of the various elements which enter 
into the value of property are to be considered 
by the assessors in making valuations for tax 
purposes, and all that can be required is that 
the assessors exercise an honest judgment, based 
upon the information they possess or are able to 
acquire. In valuing tangible property, elements 
to be considered include the advantages of the 
situation of the property, its earning capacity 
or productiveness, the purpose or use to which 
it is put, its actual earnings, and any other factors 
which may influence or enhance its actual value.'' 
51 Am. Jur. Taxation, Sec. 697, Valuation-Ele-
ments. 
The opinion of Mr. Collins specifically included all 
of the foregoing elements, and reached the result that 
the tailings dump was of nominal value and the millsite 
lands of a maximum value of $10.00 to $20.00. (B. 74, 
77) 
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We quote from Mr. Collins' testimony with respect 
to the dump lands (R. 75): 
A. I would consider any value put on it as 
simply an arbitrary value; it has no basic 
value for the ground; if I have answered your 
question correctly. 
Q. Now, if the value is to be measured by the 
use of the land to Kennecott itself, is it your 
opinion that the figure of $45.73 has any re-
lationship to that value? 
A. I would think not because it is useless land. 
I would have no idea as to the value of the 
tailings. That isn't covered in your question. 
Q. That's right, 
A. I have no idea of the value of the tailings; 
only speak of the values of the land. The 
value of the land was destroyed when these 
tailings were put upon them. 
Q. Measured by the value of the use to Ken-
necott, the figure might just as well have 
been $450 per acre or $4,500 per acre, is that 
correct? 
A. It would be just some arbitrary value. 
Q. Or $10 per acre? 
A. That's correct, 
Q. Mr. Collins, in assessing values for ta^: pur-
poses, it is perfectly proper, is it not, to 
include in the elements of value such items 
as location and use to which the land may be 
put, and possible income therefrom, and simi-
lar factors, is it not ? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you have had those in mind in expressing 
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your opinions in questions I have asked you? 
A. I have. 
With respect to the millsite lands he testified (R. 
Q. Assuming these facts, have these mill-site 
lands, or any part thereof, any reasonable 
fair cash value in the sense that this land, or 
any part thereof, would be taken in payment 
of a just debt due from a solvent debtor, and, 
of course, assume their availability for sale 
or disposition. 
A. They would have a nominal value. 
Q. Would you care to express an opinion of the 
limits which such land lands might have with 
respect to value, as contra-distinguished from 
the tailings dump lands where you said there 
was no value, or a nominal value? 
A. Say from ten to twenty dollars an acre. 
Q. Can you conceive of other uses to which 
these, or similar lands, can be put, if they 
were disposed of and not used by Kennecott? 
A, For partly grazing purposes, not farming 
because the contour of the land is not avail-
able for anything excepting that purpose, 
excepting the use it is now put to. 
Q. Then, in your opinion, and using as—assum-
ing as the basis of the assessment for tax 
purposes to be forty per cent of the reason-
able fair cash value of these mill-site lands, 
in the sense that these lands, or any part 
thereof, would be taken in payment of a just 
debt due from a solvent debtor, would the 
ad valorem tax assessment at the rate of 
$45.73 per acre be within the permissible 
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limits of the exercise of judgment by tax 
authorities? 
A. I would consider them to be greatly exces-
sive. 
Q. Would you say that would be so to the extent 
of the assessment being arbitrary? 
A. I would say it was an arbitrary assessment, 
yes, sir. 
Q. Now, assuming that we use, as a basis of 
the value, the value of those lands to Ken-
necott itself for its existing and current pur-
poses, can you express an opinion as to what 
that value might be? 
A. I 'm sure I could not. 
Q. Might it just as well be $475 per acre or 
$4,075 per acre? 
A. It could be; it would be some arbitrary figure. 
Q. Measured by the nuisance value, I presume, 
of Kennecott finding some other lands, would 
it not? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And the expense of acquiring those lands 
and moving all the mills ? 
A. That is correct. 
Mr. Hammond of the Tax Commission does not dis-
pute this result. His difference arises on the question of 
whether or not there may also be injected into the pic-
ture the special value of these lands in KennecotVs spe-
cific operation (R. 82); and this is the issue on which 
this point turns. It is admitted by all concerned that if 
this element can be injected into the picture, the lid is 
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off in that 40% of the amount at which the property 
would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a 
solvent debtor no longer applies. The upper limit is 
" astronomical,'' and the figure used depends entirely 
upon the "judgment" of the Commission. (K. 88) In 
turn the figure used could be modified at any time by 
whim, malice or any other factor within the conscious 
or unconscious minds of the Commissioners, and with 
no ready test to determine whether or not the result was 
reasonable or arbitrary. 
As was said in the case of Great Northern Eailroad 
Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 80 L. ed. 532: 
The full and true value of the property is 
the amount that the owner would be entitled to 
receive as just compensation upon a taking of 
that property by the State or the United States 
in the exertion of the power of eminent domain. 
That value is the equivalent of the property, in 
money paid at the time of the taking. Olson v. 
United States, 292 U. S. 246, 254, 78 L. ed. 1236, 
1243, 54 S. Ct. 704. The principles governing the 
ascertainment of value for the purposes of tax-
ation, are the same as those that control in con-
demnation cases, confiscation cases and generally 
in controversies involving the ascertainment of 
just compensation. West v. Chesapeake & P. 
Teleph. Co. 295 U. S. 662, 79 L. ed. 1640, 1646, 
55S.Ct.894. 
Again, as was said in the case of Lebanon & Nash-
ville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling (Tenn.), 17 S,W. (2d) 
22: 
A careful examination of the instructions 
given by the learned trial judge satisfied us that 
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he properly followed the well-established rule 
announced repeatedly in this state, in accord with 
text-book and decision authorities generally. See, 
among others, 20 C.J. 727, 728; 10 R.C.L. 128; 
Tennessee cases above cited; and authorities 
quoted in Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510, 
8 L.R.A. 123, 13 S.W. 123. We quote from the 
charge the following excerpts: 
"For the property actually taken he is en-
titled to a sum equal to its fair market value on 
the day of the appropriation. In determining 
such 'fair market value' you will assume that the 
owner of the property on the date of the appro-
priation was willing to sell, but did not have to 
do so, and that the taker desired to purchase that 
particular kind and quantity of property, but, 
like the owner, was under no particular constraint 
to make the trade and transfer. That is to say, 
you may assume that some reasonably prudent 
man wanted such property as was owned by the 
defendant and that in his survey of available 
purchases came upon the property in question and 
that the owner of such property, although he did 
not have to sell, was willing to do so for a fair 
price and full cash payment. Then what yon 
believe the property would likely bring under 
such circumstances is the figure you are justified 
in putting down as your judgment of the proper-
ty's 'fair market value.' 
"The value of the property taken cannot be 
enhanced by the owner's unwillingness to sell, 
nor is the question to be considered the peculiar 
value of the property to the oivner nor its value 
to the party condemning it. The desire of the 
defendant to keep and the need of the plaintiff 
to buy are not such considerations as should 
regulate your estimate of 'fair market value.' " 
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Likewise the annotation in 124 A.L.R. 910 is replete 
with illustrations that special values for adaptability 
of property for the particular purpose taken, are not 
to be included in the raeasure of value, instances being 
those of property for reservoir and power plant sites, 
do|cks, highways, schools, telephone and telegraph and 
power line facilities, etc. 
This is reflected in Utah law where in the case of 
Tanner v. Canal and Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 108, our 
Supreme Court said: 
Counsel, however, urge that to permit re-
spondent to use their canals as contemplated will 
be of great advantage, and may result in con-
siderable profit to him. This may be so, and yet 
the question remains, In what way does what he is 
permitted to do damage appellants? They are 
limited in their recovery by the amount of dam-
ages suffered by them. They cannot recover for 
any benefit respondent may receive. * * * 
We fully recognize that the potential need for the 
acquisition of adjacent lands as additions to the tailings 
dump has increased greatly the value of those lands 
through this possible use, and this is reflected in the 
present valuations thereof. Where we differ is with the 
Commission's contention that bejcause a lot is improved 
by the addition thereon of a $100,000.00 building, the 
value of the land as distinguished from the building 
could be set for tax purposes at a point from its cost 
to a maximum figure of $100,000.00 because this is the 
value of the use of that land to the owner. We can see 
that the improvement of the land by the addition thereto 
of a $100,000.00 building may add to and enhance the 
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value of the land on which it stands, as well as to the 
value of adjacent lands. Or the building, if a tannery, 
may well detract generally from land values of both 
the tannery site and adjacent lands. 
But the lands themselves do not directly partake 
of the values of the improvements. Such enhancement 
or diminution in land value resulting is reflected in 
market values, or as Utah's statutes read, in the value 
in money at which a creditor would accept the land in 
payment of a debt due from a solvent debtor. By depart-
ing from this standard the Tax Commission insists upon 
perpetuation of a wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and 
capricious assessment, contrary to law. 
3. 
The District Court erred in holding that the lands in 
question, particularly the tailings dump lands, were not a 
part of plaintiff's mine to which the statutory flat rate of 
$5.00 per acre should apply. 
True, not until 1942 did plaintiff, concerned with 
annual tax bills in the millions, protest to the Tax Com-
mission that its relatively insignificant assessment of the 
tailings dump and millsite lands was unjust. While 
before the court below, the Commission finally confessed 
to two protested failures to follow the statutes, it still 
refused to admit either of the bases for complaint herein-
before set forth; or Kennecott's third objection, which 
would settle the other two: the legislative mandate to 
the Commission is that metalliferous mines should be 
assessed as a unit, with the land at a flat $5.00 per acre. 
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This of course is in addition to improvements and appur-
tenances such as buildings and equipment, with the net 
proceeds the essential ingredient for the ad valorem 
assessment. 
In addition to the "crystal ball" theory that the 
Commission could evolve a "judgment" free from judi-
cial or even legislative control, counsel for the Tax 
Commission evolved two further defenses to answer this 
third point, as well as the fact that it was giving Ken-
necott "special treatment" among all the hundreds of 
Utah mines with their mills and dumps in each case 
an essential integrated part of each mine. 
The first defense was that Kennecott had failed to 
protest. This rapidly blew up, since for years Kennecott 
and its predecessors have reported the mills and dump 
lands as a part of its mine to which the statutory flat 
rate of $5.00 per acre should apply. (R. 60, 108). Inci-
dentally, this rate—let alone 100% thereof—is a liberal 
figure in the State's favor, for rarely if ever is mining 
land worth more for any purpose other than for mining. 
The second theory was more difficult to discover. 
Counsel for plaintiff had tried in vain to determine 
what possible basis the Tax Commission had for its 
discrimination. Over constant objections at the time of 
trial it was found from Higgs that neither size (R. 27), 
contiguity of the dump- or mills to the mine portal (R. 
28), physical characteristics of the land (R. 29), type 
of metal extracted or method of extraction (R. 29), were 
criteria for the difference in treatment. Then Higgs (R. 
29) pame forth with this novel contention: Section 80-
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5-56 providing for the flat $5.00 per acre was intended 
to apply only to "mining claims," and Kennecott's dump 
and mills were not located on mining claims! 
After a squabble that tried the patience of the court, 
(e.g., B. 37, 47) counsel for defendant finally admitted 
(E. 37-8): 
ME. TAYLOE: The Court propounded the 
question. 
THE COUET: He has been asking this ques-
tion for five or six minutes here, and it seemed 
clear enough to me, but we haven't had any 
answer to it, so I merely used an example. I 
don't accuse anybody of refusing to make an 
answer, but I just gave what seemed to me a 
reasonable example. I think—let's not worry 
about whether it is material or immaterial at 
this time, and, meanwhile, we can discuss that, 
and, if it isn't controlling or material, we won't 
pay any attention to it and, if you feel, for any 
reason, you want to put on any evidence pertain-
ing to it before a determination is made of this 
issue we agreed to try first, why we will hear 
everything you have to say about it. 
ME. TAYLOE: Well, in answer to the ques-
tion propounded, I will say this—and that we 
object to the question and the information that 
counsel desires, as being immaterial to the issues 
presented here today, and immaterial to any issue 
which is ultimately to be determined in this case, 
and I will say this, that counsel knows of no 
case in which a dump- is located on other than a 
mining claim, wherein it is assessed at other 
than $5 an acre; that, from information I have, 
all dumps which are located on mining claims— 
that is, the title is mining claim or is mining prop-
erty—the property, the surface itself, is assessed 
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a t tpO per acre; that the only instance that—and 
we can establish this, if necessary, by testimony— 
the only instance which has come to the attention 
of the Commission where a dump of any is located 
on other than a mining claim or mining property 
is the Kennecott Copper dump outlined on Exhibit 
A, and that it is the position of the Commission 
that that is a criterion. 
MR. BEHLE: That that is? 
MR. TAYLOR: Yes. 
MR. BEHLE: Or should be ? 
MR, TAYLOR: Is or should be. 
The witness Mr. Higgs reluctantly continued: The 
manner of surface use of the land in connection with the 
mining operation is not a criterion used by the Commis-
sion for determining whether or not the $5.00 flat rate 
should apply. (R. 49,, 50) The Kennecott dump is the 
only one in Utah receiving "special attention." (R. 50) 
That dump' is no different from any other except it is 
bigger because of the large operation and low ratio of 
metal extraction. (R. 51). In Kennecott's case alone 
the Commission directed him to use the $45.73 figure. 
(R. 53, 55) He didn't otherwise know where that mystic 
figure came from. (R. 56) He considered the tailings 
pond and mills as a unit in the entire Kennecott mining 
operation. (R. 57) He knew of no single instance where 
in practice the Commission has made an attempt to 
determine if a mine's dump or mill was physically 
located on a mining claim, or on other ground. (R. 59) 
Finally, counsel stipulated that Kennecott's dump and 
these mills were not located on '' mining claims." (R, 65) 
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I t was established that the precipitates from the 
dump were included in the mine's net proceeds tax base. 
(R. 97) Also that in applying the $5.00 flat rate to mining 
operations other than the dump, no segregation has ever 
been attempted on the basis of particular use or the type 
of patent or location, except that residential use by 
employees of a mine is treated on that additional basis 
for assessment purposes, in this case company-owned 
homes in Bingham or Copperton. (R. 42) 
Finally, it should be noted that the decision of the 
court below adverse to plaintiff was made only when he 
had first been assured by all parties that this appeal 
would be taken, saying: " I prefer you wouldn't abide 
by this decision." (R. 115) 
With this background in mind, did the lawmakers, 
using the words "mines and mining claims" constantly 
in the constitution and statutes, intend to so limit the 
flat rate assessment figure applicable to "metalliferous 
mines and mining claims" to limit dump and millsites, 
the former particularly inherently essential to and inte-
grated with the mine, to situations when these dump's 
or mills happen to be located on mining claims in the 
technical legal sense as distinguished from desert entries 
or other types of derivative or original titles to the 
particular land? 
At an early date the Utah Supreme Court in dis-
cussing these words "mines and mining claims" stated 
that the legislature did not mean just the excavation. 
In Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 
114, 93 P. 53 (1907), the court quotes from Lindley on 
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Mines wherein is reviewed and discussed the authorities 
and meaning of mines and minerals and its development 
from an original restriction to subterranean excavations, 
to modern broader meanings. The court then says: 
" Turning now to the decisions of this coun-
try, we find that the term 'mines' is not confined 
to subterranean excavations or workings, nor is 
the term 'minerals' confined to metalliferous 
ores.'' 
The $5.00 flat assessment rate plus the multiple of 
net proceeds is the method adopted by Utah's Constitu-
tion and statutes fairly to reflect and include for ad 
valorem tax purposes the special value of the mine in 
its broad sense, as distinguished from machinery, sur-
face improvements, and property used for other than 
mining purposes which can be tested for value by normal 
standards. This intention is brought out by such cases 
as Ontario Silver Mining Co. v. Utah County, 80 Utah 
491, 15 P. (2d) 633. The opinion in the Ontario Silver 
Mining case is so important to the current problems that 
we take the liberty to cite from it at length: 
The tax in question was assessed and levied 
pursuant to article 13, section 4, of our Constitu-
tion, which reads as follows: 
"All mines and mining claims, both placer 
and rock in place, containing or bearing gold, 
silver, copper, lead, coal or other valuable min-
eral deposits, after purchase thereof from the 
United States, shall be taxed at the price paid 
the United States therefor, unless the surface 
ground, or some part thereof, of such mine or 
claim, is used for other than mining purposes, 
and has a separate and independent value for 
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such other purposes; in which case said surface 
ground, or any part thereof, so used for other 
than mining purposes, * * * and all machinery 
used in mining, and all property and surface 
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines and 
mining claims, which, have a value separate and 
independent of such mines or mining claims, and 
the net annual proceeds of all mines and mining 
claims, shall be taxed" by the state board of 
equalization. (Italics ours.) 
The tax must therefore be sustained, if sus-
tained at all, by the provisions of the section we 
have just quoted. 
The Attorney General and his assistants, 
who appeared for defendant in this court, con-
tend that the tax in question is legal, and that 
it is based on and sustained by that portion of 
the section which we have italicized and to which 
we refer without repeating it here. Counsel for 
the defendant further insist that the two tunnels 
in question are property, that they are appur-
tenant to plaintiff's mine and that they "have a 
value separate and independent" from its mine. 
While no case precisely in point has been found, 
yet both sides cite and apparently rely upon the 
case of Hale v. County of Jefferson, 39 Mont. 
137, 101 Pac, 973, in which case a constitutional 
provision identically like ours was under con-
sideration. In that case a ditch which was used 
to convey water to a placer mine and by means 
of which the placer mine was being worked was 
assessed for taxation, and the owner of the mine 
and the ditch brought an action to enjoin the 
imposition of the tax. It was stipulated in that 
case that the ditch there in question, which was 
a number of miles in length, was used for the 
sole purpose of conveying water to the placer 
mine, and that the same had never been used 
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for any other purpose, and the owner had never 
derived any benefits or revenue therefrom, except 
such benefits as he derived from the use of the 
water in working the placer mine. It was con-
ceded, however, that the owner of the ditch could 
sell the water for beneficial uses for other pur-
poses, and that for said purposes the ditch would 
be valuable. The Supreme Court of Montana held 
that the ditch there in question did not constitute 
property having a value "Separate and inde-
pendent" from the placer mine within the purview 
of the provision which we have italicized above. 
* * # # 
We do not wish to be understood by what we 
have said that, merely because certain property 
is necessary to operate the mine, for that reason 
alone it may not be assessed as possessing a sep-
arate and independent value. Whether any spe-
cific property may or may not be assessed as 
having a separate and independent value can be 
best determined when the facts are presented 
for decision. It is sufficient now to hold that the 
tunnels in question are not assessable as having 
a separate and independent value under our Con-
stitution. 
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the 
two tunnels in question are not assessable for 
taxation. Any other conclusion would result in 
the taxation of any shaft, tunnel, or incline in 
any mine which the mine owner might permit 
another mine owner to use, in order to work the 
latter's mine. Moreover, we think, it was not 
contemplated by the constitutional provision 
aforesaid that any of the underground tunnels, 
drifts, or inclines of any mine which are used in 
connection with the mine, and which are neces-
sary to successfully operate the mine, like the 
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tunnels in question, should be taxed as separate 
and independent property. 
It will be noted that the assessment in the Ontario 
case was made by the old Board of Equalization about 
the same time that there was first assessed on plaintiff's 
tailings dump lands and mill'site lands the special use 
to the particular operator for its particular operations. 
Perhaps here originated the $45.73 figure. 
The decision of the court in the Tintic Standard 
case in 1932 likewise reflects the legislative intention 
to include in the special system of mine taxation on 
the basis of a multiple of net proceeds, all values peculiar 
and special to the particular mine. We quote from page 
509 of this decision; (104 Utah 505, 106 P. 2d 163).: 
# # # The machinery, plant, and buildings 
were, under the Constitution and law, required 
to be assessed independent of the mine or the 
net proceeds thereof, at full value for purposes 
of taxation, and it is presumed this was done 
and the tax paid thereon. * * * The shafts are 
comparable to the drain tunnel in Ontario Silver 
Mining Co. v. Hixon, 49 Utah 359, 164 P. 498, 
held to have no value separate and independent 
of the mine, and therefore not assessable as an 
improvement. A mine shaft is not in the same 
class of property as machinery and surface im-
provements which have a separate and independ-
ent value for taxation purposes. 
Finally, we quote from Mr. Justice Wolfe's opinion 
(unanimous in this respect) in the 1940 case of Telonis 
v. Staley, 106 P. (2d) 163, 104 Utah 505, where at .phge 
172 of the Pacific Reports he says: 
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I agree (1) that where mining property is 
involved, all the mining property to wit: mining 
claims, mineral deposits, workings, machinery 
used in connection therewith, and all buildings 
and surface improvements upon or appurtenant 
to the mines or mining claims whether on or off 
the claim, and all mills, smelters, refineries or 
reduction works used exclusively for the purpose 
of reducing or smelting ores from a mine or 
mining claim by the owner thereof} shall be assess-
ed as real estate and as a whole, all parts being 
considered as a unit for purposes of assessment, 
levy, and sale. 
In contrast to the above is the decision directly to 
the contrary by the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1947. To this we can only suggest that that 
court, concerned in other matters which were the im-
portant issues in the case, did not have before it the 
same record now before this |court; and that its opinion 
concerning the problems now at hand was neither 
thorough, nor realistic, nor even responsive to the 
record before that court. We believe that this has been 
developed in the first two points of our argument in 
view of the practical difficulties which arise if the $5.00 
flat rate does not apply. 
As to res adjudicata, we recognize that the tax 
assessment on the record and for the year 1944 before 
the United States Circuit Court is a dead duck. 
But here is a new assessment, on the facts as they 
existed at the time this new assessment was made; and 
a new cause of action and a record quite different than 
that before the Federal Court. This is not merely a 
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relitigation before the same courts of an old cause of 
action; there is no basis in this record for either res 
judicata or estoppel. This is the first time this issue 
has been before this court, which is the ultimate tribunal 
in this respect. 
Utah 's Supreme Court has stated that it will recon-
sider its own decisions for another tax year if new 
points or questions are advanced. Kennecott Copper 
Corporation v. State Tax Commission, 212 P. (2d) 187. 
That case involved different tax years where federal 
subsidies were included in the ad valorem tax base of 
the complaining mines. 
And this case differs in still another aspect. Utah 's 
courts, having by federal recognition the preemptive 
power to interpret conclusively its own statutes, are 
here for the first time called upon in connection with 
the problems of this specific case. The contention of 
the defendant and intervenor would deny this preemptive 
right, as well as the right recognized by the same court 
to reconsider its own decisions when the prior result 
for any number of good reasons in equity and justice 
should permit of correction. As was well said in the 
Sunnen case, the doctrine of res adjudicata " rests upon 
considerations of economy, of judicial time and public 
policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal 
relations." The rule is not intended as a cross on which 
to carry forever a litigant who has not had his day in 
the court which has the ultimate duty of construing 
Utah's statutes. (Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U . S . 
591, 68 S. Ct. 115, 92 L. ed. 898.) 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing we respectfully conclude: 
1. The intention of Utah's legislature and the basis 
of the constitutional plan for the assessment of mines 
(as distinguished from utilities and other operations 
referred to in the testimony of Mr. Hammond) contem-
plate, in the words of Mr. Justice Wolfe, the assessment 
of the mme as a unit. The mine is to include "all of the 
mining property, to wit: mining claims, mineral deposits, 
workings, machinery used in connection therewith, and 
all buildings and surface improvements upon or appur-
tenant to the mines or mining claims whether on or off 
the claim, and all mills, smelters, refineries or reduction 
works * * V In assessing such unit "as real estate 
and as a whole," the surface should be assessed at $5.00 
per acre; machinery, buildings and surface improvements 
which have values apart from their use in the mine, are 
to be assessed according to their "value" as in the case 
of any other such property; and the remaining values 
pertaining to the mine operation all come under the 
multiple-of-net-proceeds factor, including proceeds from 
all dumps. 
Such would be the simple, fair and reasonable solu-
tion in this case, avoiding the constant argument which 
has occurred over the years. Millsite and especially 
dump lands being so inherently and intimately connected 
with and an integral part of every mine, it just does not 
seem realistic that Utah's legislature, constitutional con-
vention and electorate intended any separation such as 
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is urged by the Tax Commission. 
As was said by the Federal Court in 1900 (In Re 
Rollins Gold & Silver Mining Co., 102 F. 985) : 
* * * Mining and milling would seem to be, 
taken together, one industry, having for its object 
" to obtain possession of material products in the 
state in which they were fashioned by nature." 
Mining, the process of extracting from the earth 
the rough ore, would seem to be the first step in 
the process, milling or reducing the second step, 
to wit: the further separating of the materials 
found together, the one from the other, and ex-
tracting from the mass the particular natural 
product desired. 
To further suggest that the legislature and the peo-
ple of this State in 1896 intended to draw the line on a 
technical distinction as to whether or not a particular 
mine's mill or dump, or any part thereof, was in one case 
upon a mining location, a milling location, a patented 
mining claim, a patented milling claim, or perhaps on a 
tunnel location or patented claim, or, in the other in-
stance, was upon a desert entry, a townsite, a railroad 
grant or a land title based upon adverse possession or 
condemnation, seems just fantastic and unreal. That it 
is utterly impractical is shown by the complete disregard 
and non-use of any such " tes t " by Utah's taxing auth-
orities in more than fifty years' administration of the 
mining tax laws. 
2. However, if due to the unfortunate Circuit Court 
decision or for any good reason, such is determined not 
to be the legislative intent and requirement, then the 
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assessment is still void because arbitrary and discrimin-
atory, and because the Commission has failed to follow 
the requisite legislative standard laid down by Sections 
80-3-1, 80-5-1 and 80-5-56 as amended. 
Measured by the legislative test of value, the dump 
lands' value is nominal and that of the millsite lands 
does not exceed $20.00; and to these beginning in 1948 
the 40% factor must be then applied as in the case of 
all other property. 
3. If the Tax Commission has failed to follow legis-
lative mandates under either of the alternatives above, 
we submit that this court has both the power and duty 
to grant the requested relief. 
As wras said in the case of People v. St. Louis Bridge 
Co.,191N.E.303: 
The fact that there may be a difference of 
opinion as to the value of property between the 
assessing authorities and the court does not 
justify interference on the part of the court. 
However, wThen the evidence shows that there 
has been a gross overvaluation, entirely out of 
proportion to the actual value of the property, 
so that it is obvious that the assessment was 
made by the taxing officers unfairly, deliberately, 
and willfully and in gross defiance of the rights 
of the property owner, the court will interpose 
in defense of the taxpayer. Pacific Hotel Co. v. 
Lieb, 83 111. 602; People v. Wiggins Ferry Co. 
supra. In a case of excessive overvaluation it is 
not necessary that intentional fraud be shown, 
but where the evidence clearly establishes that 
the assessment was made either in ignorance of 
the value of the property or not on a judgment 
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based upon readily obtainable facts, or the prop-
erty was designedly excessively valued, such con-
duct on the part of the taxing authorities amounts 
to a constructive fraud. * * * 
See also Nephi Bank v. Christensen, supra; Salt 
Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., supra, certiorari denied 
264 U. S. 590; Fox v. Groesbeck, 63 Utah 401, 226 P. 183; 
and 51 Am. Jur. 667, § 724. 
These statutory provisions are clearly for the benefit 
of the taxpayer and the rule of strictissimi juris applies. 
Tintic Undine Mining Co. v. Erckenbrack, et al., 93 Utah 
561, 74 P. (2d) 1184, 51 Am. Jur. 617, § 651-2; and 
Telonis v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. (2d) 513. Also 
the recent Idaho case of Anderson's Store v. Kootenai 
County, 215 P. (2d) 815. 
It is respectfully submitted that there is no justifica-
tion in support of the Tax Commission's persistence in 
assessing at a rate of $114.40 per acre tracts of land 
which are part of plaintiff's mine and the market value 
of which ranges from a nominal value to a maximum 
of $20.00. 
C. C. PARSONS, 
WM. M. McCREA, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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